

# CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF INSTRUCTION

J-5

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## CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION COMPLIANCE POLICY GUIDANCE

- References:
- a. "Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction," 13 January 1993
  - b. "Department of Defense Planning Guidance for Implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)," 15 January 1997
  - c. DOD Directive 2060.1, 31 July 1992, "Implementation of, and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements"
  - d. DOD Directive 5100.1, 25 September 1987, "Functions of the Department of Defense and its Major Components"

1. Purpose. This instruction provides uniform and consistent military guidance and establishes military policy for compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, reference a.

2. Cancellation. None.

3. Applicability. This instruction applies to the Military Services, the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff.

4. Policy. Enclosure A outlines administrative and operational policy concerning compliance with the CWC. The Chiefs and CINCs will use this policy guidance to promulgate their respective detailed policies.

5. Background

a. The CWC is an international treaty that prohibits the development, production, stockpiling, retention, transfer, and use of chemical weapons (CW). Each state party to the Convention must destroy all CW and CW Production Facilities (CWPF) under its jurisdiction or control. The CWC also prohibits the use of riot control agents (RCAs) as a “method of warfare.”

b. The CWC was ratified by the United States on 25 April 1997 and entered into force on 29 April 1997.

c. An important feature of the CWC is its verification regime, which relies on data declarations, systematic inspections of declared facilities, and challenge inspections. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) will receive and review data declarations, and its international inspection teams (IITs) will conduct systematic and challenge inspections to gather data as required by the Convention.

d. The CWC requires a national data declaration. Declared former CWPFs and current CW storage and destruction facilities within the United States and its territories (IN-US) will be subject to systematic inspections. US-controlled facilities, including outside the United States (OUT-US) facilities, and in rare cases, public vessels, public aircraft, and geographically separated units (for example, ground force units participating in peacekeeping operations) will be subject to a challenge inspection on relatively short notice. Also, challenge inspections may be initiated against US-controlled facilities in countries that have not ratified the CWC. Specific procedures must be in place for each command to respond quickly if a challenge inspection occurs at a facility, public vessel, public aircraft, or geographically separated unit within their area of responsibility (AOR).

e. Challenge inspection procedures between US facilities overseas and host countries will be outlined in some form of a host-country agreement (HCA) negotiated with each host country. The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Defense, is the negotiating authority for these agreements. The format of the agreement will be country-specific based on diplomatic considerations. Combatant command personnel will be included in negotiations. The HCA will endeavor to clarify with the host country that the United States will exercise its Convention's rights whenever US facilities are subject to inspection.

f. Procedures and policies for conducting systematic inspections and responding to challenge inspections of facilities, IN-US and OUT-US, are provided in the DOD Planning Guidance promulgated by the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) (USD (A&T)) in reference b. Each Military Department has established procedures to respond with an assistance team, knowledgeable in CWC rights, responsibilities, and inspection support, in case of an inspection affecting any of its Service combatant command components located within a CINC's AOR.

g. Military guidance necessary for the Military Services, the combatant commands, and the Joint Staff to train, prepare for, and support CWC inspections is provided in this instruction and its enclosures.

6. Definitions. See Glossary.

7. Responsibilities. References b and c promulgate CWC-related responsibilities within the Department of Defense. Enclosure B outlines the responsibilities of the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff (DSPP); the CINCs; and Chiefs regarding CWC compliance requirements. Focused toward the joint coordination efforts required to respond to a CWC challenge inspection, these responsibilities constitute military guidance, and in accordance with reference d, are for use by the Military Departments, the Military Services, combatant commands, and Defense agencies in the preparation of their respective detailed plans. Enclosure C provides an overview of the On-Site Inspection Agency's (OSIA) support for the Military Services and combatant commands. Enclosure D clarifies the combatant command's responsibility in the CWC data declaration process. Enclosure E provides the concept of operations for conducting a CWC challenge inspection, providing a synopsis of DOD component, agency, and combatant command activities required to execute the outlined phases. Enclosure F provides a visual overview of the CWC challenge inspection notification process. These enclosures provide military guidance to the Chiefs and CINCs, predominately for the operational execution of a CWC challenge inspection, and do not implicate any manpower or funding tasking not already assigned to the Military Departments by references b and c.

8. Summary of Changes. None.
9. Effective Date. This instruction is effective upon receipt.

For the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

/Signature/  
DENNIS C. BLAIR  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Director, Joint Staff

Enclosures:

- A-- Policy
- B-- Responsibilities and Procedures
- C-- On-Site Inspection Agency Support
- D-- Declarations
- E-- Challenge Inspection Phases
- F-- Notifications
- GL-- Glossary

ENCLOSURE A

POLICY

1. Administrative Policy

a. Discussion

(1) Overview

(a) DSPP is responsible for coordinating combatant command and Service CWC policy issues with the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (OUSD(P)) and for coordinating implementation issues with the Office of the USD(A&T); coordinating compliance issues with each Service and combatant command; coordinating combatant command and Services' issues during OPCW proceedings; and coordinating with combatant commands and Services on CWC data declarations.

(b) The USD(P) develops, coordinates, and promulgates DOD CWC implementation and compliance (I&C) policy. Based upon USD(P) CWC policy, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology (USD(A&T)), through the Chemical Weapons Agreements Implementation Working Group (CWIWG) processes, develops, coordinates, and promulgates DOD CWC I&C guidance.

(c) In accordance with references b and c, the Military Departments are responsible for developing CWC I&C plans. The CINCs are responsible for developing AOR-specific CWC I&C plans. The CINCs' I&C plans will integrate Military Department/Service and combatant command requirements with regard to CWC implementation and compliance resource planning, preparation activities, training, reporting requirements, and inspection support within the combatant command's AOR. The Services will coordinate with their Service combatant command components to ensure their Military Departments' CWC I&C plans address CINC AOR-specific requirements. CINC's I&C plans should endeavor to incorporate the existing Military Departments' I&C plans, through the Service combatant command component, maintaining

consistency with modifications dictated by AOR and combatant command unique requirements and capabilities.

(d) The CINCs, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, will coordinate with other USG Departments and agencies to develop uniform CWC I&C plans and procedures.

(2) Issue resolution

(a) In accordance with reference c, the USD(A&T) will establish the Chemical Weapons Compliance Review Group (CWCRG) to monitor and coordinate guidance on issues arising from questions of the compliance of planned or ongoing CWC-related DOD activities. The USD(P) is required to address, in consultation with the CWCRG, as appropriate, issues that require resolution to foreclose or to respond to questions of DOD compliance raised by states parties to the CWC.

(b) The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff provides a representative as a member of the CWCRG. This designee represents the Chairman on any issue that may potentially impact DOD treaty compliance. The Military Departments provide their own representation on the CWCRG.

(c) The unique and intrusive nature of inspections (especially challenge inspections) allowed for by the CWC and the requirement to maintain unity of command resulted in an expanded Host Team (HT) concept as prescribed in reference b that ensures compliance with the CWC without usurping military command authority. The HT membership will be in accordance with reference b; in addition, for OUT US inspections, the CINC may include a combatant command component representative. The HT leader, for challenge inspections at military facilities, will normally be a CJCS representative of flag rank (or equivalent). For challenge inspections, the CJCS in coordination with USD(P). may designate an alternate of flag rank (or equivalent) to serve as the HT leader. In the event that a combatant command representative (OUT-US) or Service representative (IN-US) is designated to serve as the CJCS representative and HT leader, he or she will have reporting responsibility to DSPP, who will provide CWC treaty knowledgeable staff support to the designated CJCS representative.

(d) In accordance with reference b, all HT decisions regarding the conduct of the inspection and the meeting of US obligations will be made on a consensus basis. Reference b provides procedures to decide, at the lowest level, issues within the HT and between the HT and the IIT. In accordance with reference c, DOD components will seek clearance from the USD(A&T), through the CWCRG, before taking any action that reasonably raises an issue of DOD compliance with an arms control agreement. When there is doubt whether clearance is necessary, clearance will be sought.

b. Policy

(1) The Services and combatant commands within their respective AOR will implement and comply with the provisions of the CWC in accordance with responsibilities and guidance provided in references b and c and this instruction.

(2) The Services will coordinate with their Military Departments to provide inspection support and protection planning for susceptible DOD facilities within combatant commands' AORs, as required by the individual CINC. Consistent with the concept of economy of force, CINC I&C plans should utilize individual Service or Military Department inspection support teams to the maximum extent.

(3) The Services and combatant commands, in accordance with reference c, will seek clearance from USD(A&T), through their Military Department or DSPP as appropriate, before taking any action that reasonably may raise an issue of DOD compliance with the CWC.

(4) Upon notification of a challenge inspection, the combatant commands and Military Departments will determine equities that may be potentially captured within the area described by the challenge inspection notification. If equities exist, they will then designate a representative to the HT. In the process of preparing for and conducting the inspection, issues may arise with tenant commands that require resolution. The 108-hour preparation and 84-hour inspection periods allow time to ensure that, if required, issues are resolved through the tenant's operational chain of command and the HT.

(5) Reporting and decision making chain of command

(a) The responsible Service will establish procedures for notifying its respective Military Department when issues arise concerning US compliance while conducting systematic inspections.

(b) For challenge inspections, each DOD component that identifies itself as having an equity in the area of the challenge inspection will identify itself and its operational chain of command between the affected unit and the CWCRG, to be utilized for compliance resolution issues. Each command will ensure that the appropriate operational chain of command is prepared to participate in compliance resolutions issues raised during the course of a challenge inspection.

2. Operational Policy

a. Discussion

(1) The CWC establishes a rigorous system of systematic inspections of declared facilities and challenge inspections of sites which are believed to be related to instances of noncompliance with the CWC including use of those facilities/locations for CW storage or production. The territorial scope of challenge inspections is unlimited and may extend to "any facility or location in the territory or in any other place under the jurisdiction or control of a state party requested by another state party." What is inspected within the perimeter of a facility or location is determined through negotiations between the OPCW IIT, the designated inspected state party, and the host nation (if applicable and required). For OUT-US challenge inspections, HCAs will endeavor to establish procedures to include USG representatives and host-nation representatives in perimeter negotiations, regardless of the designated inspected state party. Inspections are conducted by the IIT, which has the authority to conduct CWC inspections in areas under the jurisdiction or control of state parties to the Convention. Inspections are not conducted by IIT members from the state party that initiated the challenge.

(2) One operational impact of the United States being a state party to the CWC is the access to public vessels, public aircraft, or geographically separated units by foreign inspectors for the very



narrow purpose of CWC challenge inspections. Additionally, military facilities located outside the United States are subject to inspection. Public vessels, public aircraft, or geographically separated units may themselves be the object of a challenge inspection or be considered within the scope of an inspection if inside the perimeter of an installation which is subject to a challenge inspection. Since the CWC has application to any area under the jurisdiction or control of a state party, there may be circumstances in which commanders are required to submit to an inspection both inside and outside the United States. As a state party to the CWC, the United States Government (USG) has an obligation to demonstrate compliance with the provisions of the Convention. This demonstration may require that the United States provide access to a military facility, public vessel, public aircraft, or geographically separated unit subjected to a challenge inspection. Commanders, however, have the obligation to manage access to protect sensitive systems or prevent disclosures of classified information not related to CWC compliance.

b. Policy

(1) Under no circumstances shall commanders permit an inspection without specific approval of their operational commander. Because DOD components will seek clearance from the USD(A&T), through the CWCRCG, before taking any action that reasonably raises an issue of DOD compliance with an arms control agreement, DOD components will establish procedures for operational commanders to seek such clearance.

(2) Nothing in this guidance and references a through c alters existing DOD command relationships or the operational chain of command. For inspections of Service facilities, public vessels, public aircraft, or a geographically separated unit, the unit commander retains ultimate responsibility for the safety and security of his/her command.

(3) It is recognized that the obligation to demonstrate CWC compliance and a commander's responsibility for safety, security, and operations may, in some instances, impose what appear to be competing requirements. When necessary to resolve issues impacting compliance, the HT, which includes the unit commander, will coordinate consultation with higher authority. Resolution of the matter within the established operational chain

of command, the CWCRCG, or as coordinated with the arms control interagency, will be transmitted via the respective operational chain of command to the HT for execution.

(4) Upon approval and as directed by the operational chain of command, all facilities, public vessels, public aircraft, or geographically separated units located inside the perimeter of an area subject to a challenge inspection in the United States and overseas will comply with the CWC inspection procedures as implemented by the USG. Public vessels, public aircraft, and geographically separated units will normally not be required to remain present in a foreign port/airfield/areas longer than their previously scheduled departure time. For public vessels, public aircraft, and geographically separated units once notified of a challenge inspection, commanders will coordinate any departure and any other movement with their operational controlling authority.

(5) For challenge inspections, the right of "managed access" shall be employed in providing access to military facilities, public vessels, public aircraft, and geographically separated units. While the circumstances of managed access will be negotiated between the IIT and the HT (including the unit commander), a commander's authority and responsibility for safety and security remains inviolate. US law, which includes both specific requirements for protection of national security information, Restricted Data and Formerly Restricted Data under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, is of paramount concern when determining the degree of access that may be afforded to an inspection team during a challenge inspection. In no case will access be granted to Restricted Data or Formerly Restricted Data information. For example, access shall not be granted to naval nuclear propulsion spaces because the application of managed access tools, such as shrouding or covering, is inadequate to shield sensitive and classified information, and to do so would preclude essential monitoring of the propulsion plant. Commanders shall make every reasonable effort to demonstrate that any area, structure, or object to which the inspection team has not been granted access is not used for purposes related to the possible noncompliance concerns.

(6) Public vessels and aircraft may be subject to challenge inspections even though they are in international waters or airspace at the time the challenge inspection is announced.

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Unless otherwise directed by their operational controlling authority, commanders will not permit a challenge inspection of their ship or aircraft while under way or airborne.

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ENCLOSURE B

RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROCEDURES

1. Director For Strategic Plans and Policy, The Joint Staff  
Responsibilities and Procedures

- a. Represent the CJCS (as required) in the USG Interagency decision-making process concerning the CWC.
- b. Represent the CJCS (as required) at DOD decision-making fora including the CWIWG and CWCRCG.
- c. Assist the Services and combatant commands, as required, to ensure Military Departments' CWC I&C plans address CINC AOR-specific requirements.
- d. Develop, coordinate, and issue detailed military guidance for CWC compliance policy.
- e. Coordinate with OUSD(P), the Services, and combatant commands to develop procedures for establishment of HCAs in preparation for possible challenge inspections of US military facilities and installations worldwide. Disseminate concluded HCAs to Military Departments to facilitate assistance team planning.
- f. Determine in coordination OUSD(P), the combatant commands, and Department of State with whom the United States should establish HCAs.
- g. Coordinate activities, including communications to and from the combatant commands, for DOD implementation of, and compliance with, the CWC.
- h. Receive certification from combatant commands ensuring OUT-US military facilities and installations in affected AORs are in compliance with the CWC.
- i. Participate in notification conference calls that inform the Military Department/Service and combatant commands of any impending CWC inspection.

- j. In coordination with USD(P), coordinate, assist, and facilitate the development and dissemination of national-level guidance to supplement and reinforce existing DOD-level guidance.
- k. Serve or designate a flag-level (or equivalent) CJCS representative as HT leader for challenge inspections at military facilities worldwide. The HT leader is the principal USG spokesperson in any negotiations or formal interaction with IITs during DOD inspections. Provide or designate USG HT representation at the host country point of entry (POE) for OUT-US inspections.
- l. Develop an internal Joint Staff notification plan that identifies personnel to be notified in the event of a challenge inspection.
- m. Assist and facilitate, as requested, preparations for IN-US and OUT-US challenge inspection exercises.

2. CINC Responsibilities and Procedures

- a. All CINCs. Implement procedures to execute the administrative and operational policy outlined in Enclosure A.

- b. Geographic CINCs

- (1) OUT-US geographic CINCs are responsible for compliance with the CWC in their AOR, ensuring that all US military facilities and installations within the respective CINC's jurisdiction are in compliance with CWC provisions.
- (2) Be responsible for notifying DSPP of any concerns with regard to CWC obligations and declarations. Provide DSPP with the name and title of the CINC's Compliance Certification Official.
- (3) Promulgate CINC-specific I&C plans no later than 45 days from the date on which this guidance is formally promulgated. As required, coordinate the promulgation of the I&C plan with DSPP.
- (4) Support facilities and installations within their AOR to ensure they are prepared to implement and comply with the CWC; coordinate with Service combatant command components to ensure facilities and installations have I&C plans available to implement. The necessity for each installation to have a specific compliance plan will be determined by the CINC. For example, in USEUCOM each USAREUR area support group has an arms

control specialist who will maintain the plan for the bases in his/her area.

(5) In coordination with DSPP, OUSD(P), and the DOS, support negotiations of HCAs. USEUCOM will ensure that the HCA for Portugal includes the Azores and the HCA for Denmark includes Greenland; coordinate with USACOM as necessary.

(6) Upon receiving initial OPCW notification, notify the OSIA operations center immediately of any OPCW request for an inspection on the territory of a host country that impacts or may impact DOD equities; and pass to the OSIA operations center any additional notification information that is provided separately from initial notification, such as the location of the site to be inspected.

(7) Provide a representative to the designated POE; i.e., provide a representative to the HT for the duration of any CWC inspection at US military facilities and installations that are within the affected CINC's AOR. If tasked, advise DSPP of the flag officer to be designated as the CJCS representative and HT leader. If a flag officer is unavailable, notify DSPP advising of the next senior individual available.

(8) Per Appendix B.6.a of reference b, and as provided for in HCAs, assist the host nation in providing IIT and HT transportation from the host-nation POE to facility or installation perimeter.

(9) Coordinate inspection implementation procedures with the host country and US Embassy.

(10) Coordinate with OSIA for transportation and logistics purposes in anticipation of CWC inspections.

(11) Coordinate logistics support and accommodations (at the POE and at the inspection site) for out-of-area US HT and US Escort Team members, the Military Department/Service Assistance Team, and the Army Treaty Lab, as required. Be prepared to coordinate support for, or assist host countries in, providing IIT administrative support (communications, lodging, meals) at the POE for OUT-US challenge inspections.

(12) Ensure on-site administrative and logistic support necessary to accomplish CWC inspections is provided.

- (13) Ensure that sensitive and classified programs, information, technologies, and systems are protected.
  - (14) Ensure all necessary information is provided to support pre-inspection negotiations, which may include alternative perimeter recommendations for challenge inspections; information regarding areas that may be sensitive or unrelated to the inspection mandate; self-monitoring plans; and recommended inspection plans.
  - (15) Coordinate with OSIA for inspection support, which includes POE support, escorting, technical equipment inspections (TEI) and on-site technical support.
  - (16) Use existing resources to the maximum extent possible in carrying out inspection preparations.
- c. USCINCTrans. Provide or coordinate for Special Assignment Airlift Missions (SAAM) for movement of the US HT, Escort Team, IITs (as necessary), the Military Department/Service Assistance Team, and the Army Treaty Lab, in accordance with the appropriate priority and when requested by OSIA. USTRANSCOM will coordinate with the responsible theater CINC to ensure that USTRANSCOM units will comply to the maximum extent possible with all the supported CINCs' requirements under this enclosure.
3. Service Chiefs' Responsibilities and Procedures
- a. Implement procedures to execute the administrative and operational policy outlined in Enclosure A.
  - b. Implement their Military Department's CWC I&C plan with their Service combatant command components in coordination with the individual CINC's requirements.
  - c. In accordance with their Military Department's CWC I&C plan, ensure assistance teams deploy to support IN-US facilities and installations. For challenge inspections at OUT-US facilities, in close coordination with the combatant commands and their respective Military Department, ensure assistance teams are deployed to support facilities/installations, public vessels, public aircraft, and geographically separated units.



- d. In accordance with their Military Department's policy, prepare and submit all data declarations required by the CWC. Coordinate with the combatant commands and their Service combatant command components to ensure all data declarations have been submitted.
- e. For inspections at facilities OUT-US, coordinate with the combatant commands on all aspects of any impending inspection.
- f. In coordination with the combatant commands and as necessary provide a representative to the host nation POE, and provide a representative to the HT for the duration of any CWC inspection with a Service equity.
- g. Develop and negotiate relevant memorandums of agreement with other DOD components, Military Departments, Services, and combatant commands to carry out CWC implementation procedures.
- h. Assist combatant commands in conducting tabletop seminars and mock inspections to exercise CINC I&C plans.
- i. When required provide an individual of flag rank (or equivalent) to be designated as the CJCS representative for IN-US challenge inspections.

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ENCLOSURE C

ON-SITE INSPECTION AGENCY SUPPORT

On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) Support

- a. Provide POE processing and logistical support for OPCW IITs for all CWC inspections of US facilities located within the United States and outside the United States, as appropriate.
- b. Provide national escorts for the IITs for all CWC inspections of DOD facilities. In accordance with reference b, in the absence of a representative from OUSD(P) normally serve as the HT leader for initial, routine, and close-out inspections at declared facilities for which DOD serves as lead agency.
- c. Perform and coordinate TEI and certifications for all CWC inspections of US facilities.
- d. Assist and support Services, combatant commands, and DOD components in coordinated, standardized preparation for inspections.
- e. As the designated cost settlement agent for inspections conducted at all DOD sites and facilities, OSIA will collect from the DOD components and report to OSD all reimbursable inspection-related costs incurred to support the CWC inspections.
- f. Provide notification of CWC inspections to DOD components. OSIA, via conference call, will notify the Military Department/Service, the National Military Command Center (NMCC), Office of the Secretary of Defense offices, DOD component, and combatant commands with cognizance over the facility to be inspected.
- g. Arrange SAAMs for movement of the HT, Escort Team, IIT, the Military Department/Service Assistance Team, and the Army Treaty Lab, in accordance with the appropriate priority. SAAM missions are performed on a reimbursable basis.

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## ENCLOSURE D

### DECLARATIONS

1. The CWC requires declaration of CW production, storage, and destruction facilities, as well as other facilities used primarily for the development of CW. The CWC also requires declaration of the chemical names, structural formulae, and Chemical Abstract Service (CAS) registry numbers of all RCAs held for riot control purposes. The CWC does not require reporting of quantities and locations of RCA inventories.
2. The CINCs should not have any declaration requirements other than those for RCAs. CINCs, however, must verify declaration requirements for their respective AORs. Upon promulgation of this instruction, CINCs will ensure that Service combatant command components coordinate appropriately with Military Department Executive Agents for CWC compliance and implementation to confirm declaration requirements and prepare/submit necessary declaration inputs (e.g., RCAs).
3. The CWC further requires that any changes to the RCA declaration be reported within 30 days after the change becomes effective. Consequently, combatant commands must remain aware of the current US RCA declaration, and ensure that Service combatant command components immediately report acquisition of any RCAs not identified in the US RCA declaration to their Military Department's Executive Agent.

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## ENCLOSURE E

### CHALLENGE INSPECTION PHASES

The following is not an inspection checklist. It provides a synopsis of activities, integrating DOD component, agency, and combatant command activities that will occur during the phases of a challenge inspection.

#### 1. Phase I: Notification (Also See Enclosure F Notification)

##### a. IN-US

(1) The OPCW receives request for challenge inspection of an IN-US facility. Executive Council of the OPCW may decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out the challenge inspection if they consider the inspection request frivolous, abusive, or beyond the scope of the Convention.

(2) The OPCW notifies the United States (specifically, the Nuclear Risk Reduction Center (NRRC) receives this initial notification). Information will include time of arrival of the IIT at the POE and the location of the inspection site.

(3) The NRRC initiates a call to OSIA operations center, which immediately initiates a conference call to notify the Military Department/Service, DSPP, OSD, and the DOD component with cognizance over the facility to be inspected.

(4) In accordance with reference b, the designated HT members will be notified and meet the IIT at the POE to commence perimeter negotiations. The IIT will arrive at the POE no earlier than 12 hours following initial OPCW notification.

##### b. OUT-US

(1) The OPCW receives a request from a state party who wishes to challenge a specific facility outside of the United States. The Executive Council of the OPCW may decide by a three-quarter majority of all its members against carrying out the challenge inspection if they consider the inspection request frivolous, abusive, or beyond the scope of the Convention.

(2) If the challenged state party is the host country, the OPCW notifies the host country (NRRC equivalent) that a challenge inspection has been initiated. If the challenged state party is the United States, the OPCW notifies the US NRRC and the host-country NRRC equivalent that a challenge inspection has been initiated against a US OUT-US facility. The Convention requires that, in the case of an inspection of a facility of a state party located on the territory of another state party, both state parties shall be simultaneously notified. Information should include time of arrival of the IIT at the designated POE and the location of the inspection site. The NRRC notifies the OSIA operations center, which notifies the impacted combatant command's operations center and other designated DOD components. In the case when the host country is the designated challenged state party, the HCA will also establish procedures for the host country to notify a US representative in area; e.g., the embassy or the combatant command's operations center. In the event the combatant command receives notification from the host country prior to OSIA notification, the combatant command will immediately notify OSIA and ensure facility notification.

(3) The US facility, public vessel, public aircraft, or geographically separated unit may not be specifically designated within the challenge inspection request. Regardless, the HCA will establish the method and procedures for the host country to notify the United States in the event of any challenge inspection to the host country that may involve US assets. Based upon the information contained within the initial notification, the combatant command representatives will assess the potential impact on a DOD facility and notify OSIA, which will initiate notification procedures. Subject to the HCA, US representatives are expected to observe perimeter negotiations to confirm or determine the possibility of a US facility, public vessel, public aircraft, or geographically separated unit being captured within or near the perimeter and will disseminate that information.

## 2. Phase II: Movement To POE

- a. IN-US. The US HT will assemble at the POE prior to the arrival of the IIT. If the location of the challenged facility is already known, the Military Department/Service assistance team will deploy to the facility to begin inspection preparations.
- b. OUT-US. For an OUT-US challenge inspection, DSPP and OUSD(P), OSIA, and impacted Military Department/Service representatives will assemble at US POE, Dulles International Airport, for further



transportation to the OUT-US POE. Time and distance factors may require the aircraft to fly directly to or near the site, bypassing POE perimeter negotiations. As required by the CINC, Military Department assistance teams will deploy to the inspection site by the quickest available means. The combatant command, applicable Service combatant command components, and OSIA contingents, if available, will deploy representatives to the designated POE to commence and participate in POE discussions. The CINC representative will temporarily assume responsibility for the CJCS representative as HT leader until arrival of IN-US contingent of US HT. If CJCS through DSPP has designated the CINC representative as HT leader, this designation will be accomplished through message traffic and all concerned DOD components will be action addressees on the message. If DSPP or OSD provides the HT leader, the CINC representative will become a member of the HT. Other Service combatant command components (e.g., USAFE) provide HT members per the CINC's direction.

3. Phase III: POE Activities

a. IN-US

(1) Upon arrival of the IIT at the IN-US POE, Washington Dulles International Airport, the HT will commence discussions, to include on a priority basis inspection mandate review and negotiations on the requested perimeter.

(2) OSIA will meet, process, and provide logistics support for the IIT at the POE. These arrangements will include meals and lodging for the inspectors while at the POE as well as conference and working spaces for the conduct of POE discussions.

(3) OSIA will perform the TEI of all inspection equipment brought by the IIT prior to the inspection.

b. OUT-US. Designated CINC and Service combatant command component representatives, as well as OSIA representatives (if available), will meet at the host country-designated POE and will commence/participate in POE discussions. This indigenous HT may desire to finalize the perimeter during POE negotiations. Because the decision making process is based on consensus, the HT representatives present at the POE will communicate the proposed final perimeter to the other HT members to gain consensus. The host country and OSIA will perform the TEI and will arrange for meals and lodging for the IIT while at the POE. If the HCA fails to achieve this predetermined cooperation, the combatant

command or OSIA will be required to fulfill this responsibility. Per reference b, the combatant command will be reimbursed by OSIA for inspection-related expenses incurred. In the absence of the ability to conduct a POE TEL, OSIA will be prepared to inspect the equipment prior to its use in the inspection process.

4. Phase IV: Movement To Inspection Site

a. IN-US. POE discussions will end at such time to permit the IIT and HT to arrive at the inspection site no later than 36 hours after the IIT's arrival at the POE. If the challenged site is within 4 hours driving distance from the POE, OSIA will provide ground transportation. If the challenged site is beyond the 4-hour driving distance from the POE, OSIA will arrange for air transportation. OSIA will coordinate with the cognizant Military Department/Service to arrange necessary administrative and logistic support for the IIT at the inspected site.

b. OUT-US. The IIT, in company with HT members that arrived at the designated POE, will depart the POE for the inspection site. The HCA will designate the transportation responsibilities of the host country during a CWC challenge inspection; however, the combatant command should be prepared to support in-country transportation, as required. Per reference b, the combatant command will be reimbursed by OSIA for inspection-related expenses incurred.

5. Phase V: Pre-Inspection

a. IN-US

(1) Once the IIT arrives in the vicinity of the inspection site, access within the site must be granted within 108 hours from the IIT arrival at the POE. If a final perimeter has not yet been agreed to prior to IIT arrival, then perimeter negotiations will continue until one is agreed upon by the HT and the IIT. If one is not agreed upon within 72 hours from the IIT's arrival at the site, then the inspected state party's (US) proposed alternative perimeter shall be designated the final perimeter.

(2) The affected facility will provide all necessary information to support pre-inspection negotiations, to include alternative perimeter recommendations and information regarding areas that may be sensitive or not related to the challenge inspection mandate.

(3) Upon the IIT's arrival in the vicinity of the inspection site and prior to granting access to the inspection site, the facility will present a safety and logistical briefing to the IIT. Applicable portions of this briefing should be provided to the IIT prior to their commencement of perimeter activities. In accordance with reference b, the Department of Defense intends to fully exercise its rights under the CWC and will therefore use, as required, the full 108 hours allowed by the CWC (from the inspection team arrival at the POE until access within the final perimeter is granted) for facility safety, security, and operational considerations.

(4) If queried by the media, site public affairs (PA) officers will have the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD(PA)) guidance. This will include a challenge inspection statement to be given to the press and specific questions and answers that are to be used only in response to queries. Additional queries from both US or foreign media will be referred to OASD(PA).

(5) Development of the initial inspection plan occurs during this phase.

b. OUT-US

(1) The IIT and the HT will arrive at the inspection perimeter. The HT, which includes the facility commander or his/her designee, will continue perimeter negotiations if not agreed to previously in accordance with subparagraph 3b. In accordance with reference b, the Department of Defense intends to fully exercise its rights under the CWC and will therefore use, as required, the full 108 hours allowed by the CWC (from the inspection team arrival at the POE until access within either the final perimeter or USG assets is granted) for facility safety, security, and operational considerations.

(2) 2 through 5 above apply.

6. Phase VI: Inspection: IN-US and OUT-US

- a. There is an 84-hour period allotted for the inspection.
- b. OSIA will escort inspectors for all DOD CWC challenge inspections.
- c. Per reference b, if an issue arises during the inspection and consensus cannot be reached among the HT, the issue will be referred up the HT members' respective operational chains of command for

resolution at the lowest level possible. The DOD CWCRG will be kept informed and accessible for inspection process decisions. Each command representative on the HT will ensure that it has effective communications with its respective chain of command.

7. Phase VII: Post Inspection and Movement of the IIT Out of Country

a. IN-US

(1) The IIT will have 24 hours following completion of inspection to prepare and submit its preliminary findings to the HT leader. The HT will provide preliminary comments on the findings and the HT leader will initial to signify receipt, and ensure that the facility commander and the CWCRG receive copies.

(2) OSIA will transport the IIT back to the POE for departure as soon as possible following the inspection.

(3) In accordance with Military Department/Service I&C plans, the HT will conduct a debrief at the facility and will begin preparing an after-action report of the inspection.

b. OUT-US

(1) The IIT will have 24 hours following completion of inspection to prepare and submit its preliminary findings to the HT leader. The HT will provide preliminary comments on the findings and the HT leader will initial to signify receipt. The HT leader will ensure that the facility commander and CWCRG receive copies.

(2) The combatant command, in conjunction with OSIA and the host country, will ensure transport of the IIT back to the POE for departure as soon as possible following the inspection.

(3) In accordance with Military Department/Service and CINC I&C plans, the HT will conduct a debrief at the facility and will begin preparing an after-action report of the inspection.

8. Phase VIII: Post Inspection Report: IN-US and OUT-US

a. Per the CWC, the IIT will submit a preliminary inspection report to the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW no later than 72 hours after the IIT returns to its headquarters. The report will be promptly transmitted to the United States, the requesting State Party, and the


Executive Council of the OPCW. Affected Military Department/Service and combatant commands will be provided with the report for review and comment. In the case of OUT-US inspections, the CINC and DSPP will coordinate efforts with OSD to release applicable information in accordance with the HCA to the host country for its comments on the report.

b. Per the CWC, the OPCW will make a draft final inspection report available to the United States no later than 20 days after the completion of the challenge inspection. The affected Military Department/Service and combatant command will review the report for accuracy and provide any comments to DSPP for inclusion in the USG comments to the final inspection report. In the case of OUT-US inspections, the combatant command and DSPP will coordinate efforts with OSD to release applicable information in accordance with the HCA to the host country for its comments on the report. Comments on the final draft of the inspection report should be submitted to the Technical Secretariat not later than 10 days after receipt. The final report will be presented to the Director General, OPCW, not later than 30 days after completion of the challenge inspection.


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ENCLOSURE F  
NOTIFICATIONS

IN-US CHALLENGE INSPECTION INITIAL NOTIFICATION PROCESS



OUT-US CHALLENGE INSPECTION INITIAL NOTIFICATION PROCESS



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## GLOSSARY

### PART I--ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AOR	area of responsibility
CI	Challenge Inspection
CINCs	Commanders of combatant commands
CJCS	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
CRG	Compliance Review Group
CW	chemical weapons
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
CWCRG	Chemical Weapons Compliance Review Group
CWPF	Chemical Weapons Production Facility
DOD	Department of Defense
DSPP	The Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, Joint Staff
EIF	entry into force
HCA	host country agreement
HT	host team
I&C	implementation and compliance
IIT	international inspection team
IN-US	inside United States (to include Hawaii and Alaska and US territories)
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JS	The Joint Staff
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NRRC	Nuclear Risk Reduction Center
OATSD(NCB)	Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs
OUT-US	Outside the United States
OPCW	Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency

OUSD(P)	Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
PA	public affairs
POE	point of entry
RCA	riot control agents
SAAM	Special Assignment Airlift Mission
TEI	technical equipment inspection
USG	United States Government

## GLOSSARY

### PART II--DEFINITIONS

**Alternative Perimeter.** The inspection perimeter proposed by the host team as an alternative to the requested inspection perimeter specified by the State Party requesting a challenge inspection. Presentation of the alternative perimeter by the United States Government to the International Inspection Team must occur no later than 24 hours after arrival of the International Inspection Team at the Point of Entry. The alternative perimeter must contain the entire requested perimeter and should meet at least two of the following conditions:

- a. Does not extend to an area significantly greater than that of the requested perimeter.
- b. Is a short, uniform distance from the requested perimeter.
- c. At least part of the requested perimeter is visible from the alternative perimeter.

It should, as a rule, bear a close relationship to the requested perimeter, taking into account natural terrain features and man-made boundaries. It should normally run close to the surrounding security barrier, if such a barrier exists.

**Approved Equipment.** The devices and/or instruments necessary for the performance of the international inspection team's duties that have been certified by the Technical Secretariat in accordance with agreed procedures. Such equipment may also refer to administrative supplies or data recording materials that would be used by the international inspection team.

**Assistance Team.** A team deployed by a Military Department or Service to assist the installation in preparing for a challenge inspection. The team is to arrive at the site within 12 hours of the initial notification. At the inspection site, the assistance team will support the installation/site commander by clarifying any Chemical Weapons Convention compliance questions, advising on preparation and support procedures for the inspection, and augmenting the installation staff, as needed.

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative. The individual from either the Service or combatant command designated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to represent him as the host team leader. This individual has reporting responsibility directly to the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff, in their function as the Chairman's representative.

Challenge Inspection. A short-notice inspection of a specific site of one state party requested by another state party, conducted by the an Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons' international inspection team. States may be "challenged" by other states to resolve compliance concerns. Challenge inspection procedures are covered under Article IX of the Chemical Weapons Convention and Part X of the Chemical Weapons Convention Verification Annex.

Chemical Weapons. Chemical Weapons are:

- a. Toxic chemicals and their precursors, except where intended for purposes not prohibited under the Convention, as long as the types and quantities involved are consistent with such purposes;
- b. Munitions and devices specifically designed to cause death or other harm through the toxic properties of those chemicals, which would be released as a result of the employment of such munitions and devices;
- c. Any equipment specifically designed for use directly in connection with the employment of such munitions or devices.

NOTE: The term "chemical weapon" does not apply to nonlethal chemicals which are used by a state party for domestic law enforcement and riot control purposes (e.g., riot control agents).

Chemical Weapons Agreements Implementation Working Group (CWIWG). A Department of Defense-wide working group, chaired by OATSD(NCB)(C/BM), that will review Chemical Weapons Convention implementation issues on a regular basis.

Chemical Weapons Production Facility (CWPF). Any equipment or building housing such equipment that was designed, constructed, or used since 1 January 1946: (1) for the production flow of any Schedule 1 chemical or any other chemical that has no use for permitted purposes above one ton per year; and (2) for the filling of Schedule 1 chemicals into munitions, devices, or bulk containers.

Compliance. Compliance assures that existing and future armed service programs and activities legally and technically comply with the terms of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Compliance includes executing the Implementation & compliance plan; destroying the Chemical Weapons stockpile and former Chemical Weapons production facilities; changing doctrine, as required; reporting Convention-required data declarations; and making Convention-required notifications. Compliance also includes not doing what the Convention forbids, including developing Chemical Weapons, stockpiling Chemical Weapons, and training for the employment of Chemical Weapons.

Compliance certification official. The individual responsible for certifying that his or her respective combatant command is in compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention. This individual is responsible for signing the command's compliance and implementation plan. It is recommended this individual be the combatant command's counterpart to the Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, the Joint Staff. Certification officials for Military Departments are determined by the Military Department's policy.

Compliance Review Group. A Department of Defense-wide working group, chaired by OATSD(NCB)(C/BM), that conducts an executive-level review of Chemical Weapons Convention compliance issues. The Compliance Review Group meets on an as-needed basis to address key issues, such as a challenge inspection.

Consensus Decision Making. Resolution of all issues pertaining to DOD compliance with the CWC, the commencement and conduct of the inspection shall be accomplished by consensus among host team members. This will be interpreted more stringently than simple majority. All matters involving safety, operations, and security shall have the concurrence of all members of the host team, and if not, shall be referred to the operational chain of command for resolution.

Declared Facility. A chemical weapons related installation, factory, or plant that was declared by the United States in accordance with the requirements of the Convention. Declared facilities must comply with specific verification activities, like systematic inspections, that may include on-site continuous instrument monitoring. Requirements will be defined in a facility agreement. Facilities are declared based on a range of criteria, including production, storage, or a history of Chemical Weapons research, development, or testing.

Entry Into Force. April 29, 1997, the specific date when the provisions of the Convention became effective. Entry into force for those countries

who are not original States Parties is 30 days after the nation deposits its instrument of ratification with the United Nation's Secretary General.

Exit Monitoring. The international inspection team has the right to monitor the exits of the site to ensure that prohibited materials are not being surreptitiously removed to avoid the challenge inspection. This monitoring begins when the IIT arrives at the alternative or final perimeter, whichever occurs first and may continue for the duration of the inspection.

Facility Agreement. An agreement between a state party and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons relating to a specific declared facility subject to systematic inspection. The agreement will include detailed provisions governing inspection procedures at that facility.

Final (Inspection) Perimeter. The inspection site perimeter as agreed in Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection negotiations between the international inspection team and the inspected State Party. (See also Requested Perimeter, Alternative Perimeter.)

Host Team (HT). The group of Department of Defense representatives responsible for negotiating with an international inspection team and accompanying the international inspection team throughout the inspection. The host team may include representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the commander in chief of the combatant command, the Service combatant command component, On-Site Inspection Agency, affected Military Department or Service(s), Department of Defense component, and the inspected facility/unit

Implementation. Includes all tasks and actions taken by the combatant commands and Military Departments/Services to prepare for and undertake obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention. Implementation includes preparing facilities for inspection, receiving Chemical Weapons Convention inspections, and chemical weapons destruction.

Implementation and Compliance Planning. Implementation and compliance planning ensures that the Military Departments/Services and combatant commands are prepared to implement and comply with the Chemical Weapons Convention to include programs, procurement, and operations. Implementation and compliance planning includes all tasks and actions taken to refine resource allocation planning as

Chemical Weapons Convention requirements are identified, to prepare implementation and compliance, destruction, notification, and education and training plans, and to alert inspectable Service and contractor facilities.

Inspected State Party. The State Party on whose territory, or any other place under its jurisdiction/control, an inspection pursuant to the Chemical Weapons Convention takes place.

Inspection Mandate. The authorization issued by the Director General to the international inspection team which provides instructions for the conduct of a particular inspection. For a challenge inspection, the inspection mandate will also outline the compliance concern raised by the challenging State Party.

Inspector. An individual designated by the Technical Secretariat and representing the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons who will carry out an inspection in accordance with the Chemical Weapons Convention, its annexes, and facility agreements between states parties and the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. Inspectors must be citizens of a State Party to the Convention. They will have diplomatic rights and responsibilities. Inspectors are designated on a list provided to and approved by each State Party to the Convention. In the case of a challenge inspection, no inspector shall be from the requesting or inspected State Party.

International Inspection Team. The purpose of the international inspection team is to conduct inspections or visits in accordance with the Convention. The number of inspectors will be determined by the Technical Secretariat and will depend upon the size of the facility being inspected. For routine inspections, challenge inspections, and investigations of alleged use, an international inspection team may be composed of members from any of the states parties with the exception that an inspection conducted at a United States facility will likely not include a United States member in the international inspection team. For challenge inspections, the team may be composed of members from any of the states parties, except for the challenging and the challenged states parties, and may include an observer from the state requesting the challenge.

IN-US. Inside the United States, to include Hawaii and Alaska and United States territories.

Lead Agency. The United States Government department or agency that is the owner or sponsor of a particular facility being declared or inspected under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Managed Access. A method of protecting sensitive information, while facilitating inspector access to an area of a facility that has overriding national security or proprietary concerns not related to chemical weapons. Such measures may include, but are not limited to, removal of sensitive papers from office spaces; shrouding of sensitive pieces of equipment, displays, or dials on such equipment; logging off computer systems and turning off data-indicating devices; providing access to a certain percentage of buildings or rooms within a building; or providing access to only selected members of an international inspection team. The actual methods to be used for managed access will be determined on a case-by-case basis and, if necessary, negotiated between the international inspection team and the host team.

Observer. A representative of a requesting state party, or a third state party designated by the requesting state party, to observe a Chemical Weapons Convention challenge inspection.

Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. The international organization established under the Chemical Weapons Convention with broad authority for conducting worldwide activities to eliminate the production and use of Chemical Weapons. It is located in The Hague, Netherlands.

OUT-US. Outside the United States. Does not include Alaska and Hawaii and United States territories.

Perimeter. In the case of a challenge inspection, the external boundary of the inspection site, defined by either geographic coordinates or a description on a map. In the case of an inspection of a declared site, the external boundary of the facility declared as shown in the declaration or the negotiated facility agreement.

Perimeter Activities. Activities conducted by the international inspection team at the perimeter of an inspected site. In the case of a challenge inspection, these activities occur upon the international inspection team's arrival at the alternative or final perimeter, whichever occurs first, and may continue for the duration of the inspection.

Perimeter activities explicitly permitted by the Convention's text include using monitoring equipment and taking wipes, air, soil, or effluent



samples. The international inspection team may also conduct additional activities agreed to by the inspected state party.

Perimeter activities at a nondeclared site must take place within a band 50 meters in width, measured outward from the perimeter. Upon agreement with the inspected state party, the international inspection team may have access to any building or structure within the 50-meter band. All directional monitoring at the perimeter must be directed inward. In the case of declared facilities, at the discretion of the inspected state party, the 50-meter perimeter band could run inside, outside, or on both sides of the declared perimeter.

Perimeter activities include exit monitoring by the international inspection team, which includes the identification of vehicular exits, the making of traffic logs, the taking of photographs, and the making of video recordings by the inspection team of exits and exiting traffic. The international inspection team has the right to go, under escort, to any other part of the perimeter to check that there is no other exit activity. The international inspection team has the right to inspect, on a managed access basis, vehicular traffic exiting the site with the exception of personnel and personal vehicles leaving the site. Personnel and vehicles entering the site are not subject to inspection.

Perimeter Monitoring Team. International inspection team members designated to perform perimeter activities.

Period of Inspection. The time period from when the international inspection team crosses the final perimeter until the completion of verification activities.

Point of Entry/Exit. The location designated for the United States in-country arrival of international inspection teams and for their departure after completion of each inspection mission. Washington Dulles International Airport is the US designated point of entry for international challenge inspection teams under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Pre-inspection Activities. A designated time period in which to deliver all necessary welcome, orientation, safety, medical, and informational briefings, complete office and lodging assignments, and answer general questions before the commencement of an inspection.

Precursor. Any chemical reactant that takes part, at any stage or by any method, in the production of a toxic chemical. This includes any key component of a binary or multicomponent chemical system.

Public vessel or aircraft. Means a vessel or aircraft that is owned or chartered, and operated by or for the United States Government and is not engaged in commercial service.

Random Selective Access. A method of managed access that allows international inspection teams to choose a percentage of buildings or containers within an area or a percentage of rooms in a building to be inspected.

Requested Perimeter. The inspection perimeter specified by the international inspection team upon its arrival at the point of entry to conduct a challenge inspection. The requested perimeter must conform to the following:

- a. Run at least 10 meters outside any buildings or other structures.
- b. Not cut through any existing security enclosures.
- c. Run at least 10 meters outside any existing security enclosures that the requesting state party intends to include within the requested perimeter.

If the initial requested perimeter does not conform to the above specifications, it shall be redrawn by the international inspection team. The requested perimeter, as modified by the international inspection team, is presented to the inspected state party at the point of entry. If the inspected state party does not agree to the requested perimeter, it may propose an alternative perimeter for consideration by the international inspection team. If no agreement is reached on a perimeter within 24 hours after the international inspection team arrives at the point of entry, then the international inspection team will be transported to the alternative perimeter, arriving no later than 12 hours after departure from the point of entry.

Requesting State Party. A state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which has requested a challenge inspection.

Riot Control Agent. Any chemical not listed in a Schedules, which can produce rapidly in humans sensory irritation or disabling physical effects which disappear within a short time following termination of exposure.

Routine Inspections. Synonymous with the term Systematic Inspections, defined below.

Schedules of Chemicals. Collectively refers to the three lists of toxic chemicals and precursor chemicals that will be monitored under the Chemical Weapons Convention. The three lists are referred to individually as Schedule 1, Schedule 2, and Schedule 3.

Self Monitoring. Refers to exit monitoring procedures undertaken by the inspected state party during a challenge inspection. These self-monitoring procedures must begin no later than 12 hours after the arrival of the international inspection team at the point of entry and involve the collecting of factual information on all vehicular exit activity (land, water, and air) from the requested perimeter.

Special Assignment Airlift Mission. All domestic requirements and those requiring special pickup or delivery by Air Mobility Command at points other than those within the established Air Mobility Command route pattern, or requirements for movement within this pattern that require special consideration because of the number of passengers involved, the weight or size of the cargo, or other special factors.

Specialized Equipment. Equipment designed and used specifically and exclusively for the production of chemical weapons. This includes any piece of equipment that has been in contact with Schedule 1 chemicals, or would be in contact with them if the plant were operating, chemical weapons filling machines, and any other equipment specially designed, built, or installed for the operation of the facility as a chemical weapons Production Facility. [CWC Verification Annex, Part I, para5(a)]

State Party. Any nation that has deposited its instrument of ratification prior to entry into force or has deposited its instrument of ratification with the United Nations Secretary General after 29 April 1997 and the prerequisite 30 days have passed.

Systematic Inspections. On-site inspections and monitoring with on-site instrumentation by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to confirm that Chemical Weapons Convention declarations are accurate and that the nation is meeting its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention.

Technical Equipment Inspection Program. A treaty mandated, On-Site Inspection agency managed, community developed and supported program created to address safety, environmental, and technical countermeasure concerns of foreign arms control equipment.

Technical Secretariat. The organizational body of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons responsible for implementing Chemical Weapons Convention verification procedures. Among its many functions, the Technical Secretariat maintains lists of accredited inspectors, defines inspection procedures, schedules routine inspections, and conducts challenge inspections.

Toxic Chemical. Any chemical which, through its chemical action on life processes, can cause death, temporary incapacitation, or permanent harm to humans and animals. This includes all such chemicals, regardless of their origin, method of production, or whether they are produced in facilities, munitions, or elsewhere.

United States Approved and Certified CWC Equipment. All foreign arms control equipment intended for use in United States facilities shall be subject to formal On-Site Inspection Agency technical equipment inspection certification. This process ensures that safety, environmental, and technical countermeasure considerations for all the types of facilities at which such equipment is likely to be used are taken fully into account.

Verification. The culmative process of determining that a state party is complying with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention. On-site inspections and visits will be used for verification. The purpose of these verification activities is to confirm that declarations are accurate, that no undetected removal of chemical weapons from facilities takes place, that the identity and quantity of the chemical weapons stocks and facilities to be destroyed are accurate, and that they have been destroyed.